The name S.L.A. Marshall should be familiar to anyone who has read On Killing as Grossman basis much of his thesis on SLAM's writings and quotes SLAM often. Grossman even calls SLAM the greatest and most influential of these pioneers and the creator of the firing rate of 15-20% among soldiers in combat. Not sure if this has been discussed here before but here's some information I found anyway.
Here's a link to SLAM's book from Google books,
Men Against Fire. Compare SLAM's impression of the capture of Makin Island (pages 55 & 56) with this one from
The Capture of Makin (20 - 24 November 1943)
Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1990 First printed by the Historical Division, War Department, 1946 The men in these three adjacent perimeters had left their entrenching tools with their packs early on this long day and in addition, were dead tired. Their foxholes were shallow, consisting sometimes merely of pieces of coconut log ranged around as a protective bulwark. Positions selected for the mounting of machine guns were chosen with less care for an open field of fire than would have been the case had not the troops, like the higher command, concluded that the enemy were almost eliminated. At several points the undergrowth was thick enough to furnish considerable cover for infiltrating Japanese. The men were instructed not to use rifles, however, except for the repulse of a direct attack.
The enemy came upon them as soon as darkness had fallen. First they sent ahead a party of natives who sought to pass through the perimeter to their hamlet farther west. Then the Japanese themselves came down the road, imitating the cries of a baby in an effort to pass themselves off as another native group until they had reached the American lines. The ruse was recognized, a challenge was given, and machine-gun fire poured among them just before they had deployed.
A little later attempts were made to draw American fire and reveal the location of the antitank guns, machine guns, BAR's, and covering rifles. Although they mounted some machine guns themselves, the Japanese more often came down the road in groups, deployed, and then attacked singly or in small teams, Some infiltrated and fired at forward positions from the rear. Others crawled forward through the underbrush to fire, to draw fire, or to pull in their
wounded. Barefoot Japanese fan upon the fox holes and the gun positions, fired at almost point-blank range, and jumped into a melee with the Americans, who killed them with knives or clubbed weapons at the end of a yelling, shouting struggle. Grenades sailed back and forth from one side to another. One sniper, shot out of a tree, landed in a foxhole beneath him occupied by a company commander.
Between attacks, the enemy crawled back to their own lines to drink saki from glasses whose clinking, amid sounds of drunken gaiety, could be heard by the silent and isolated Americans. Some Japanese carried canteens of liquor, and one was found at daylight, standing beneath a tree, alternately shooting a few rounds and singing loudly and unpleasantly. In fox holes beside the guns, wounded, determined Americans soberly held on as their weapons went out of commission and their ammunition ran low. At one point, they could hear a clock with chimes striking the hour in a primitive grass but close at hand, and thus they were made more strongly aware of the dragging passage of the night. just before dawn, the oil and patches in a spare-parts kit ignited and burst into flames which illuminated one post. Rifle and machine-gun fire then rained on the spot from the Japanese. At some points, mortar fire also fell.
Daylight alone brought relief. Three dead and 25 wounded lay in the American lines. Fifty-one enemy dead were counted in front of American guns, but the enemy's casualties were riot computable, since the wounded had dragged themselves, or been taken, back into the woods to die. All positions remained in the defenders' hands, and the survivors around the pivotal machine guns and antitank guns on the left flank, who had been engaged throughout the night, rejoined their units when they formed up for the advance. The Japanese action on what came to be known as "Saki Night" may have beer] heavy patrolling," or "banzai attacks," but it was the last concerted resistance by an utterly desperate remnant of the original Japanese force.
Some of the enemy tried to move out of the swamps south of Tanimaiaki village that night by crossing the reef to Kurria Island. At midnight about ten of them approached the 105th Infantry detail's defense line there and were either killed or wounded in the attempt to cross. Unless others had gone beyond Kenna. before the detail arrived, the last vestiges of the original Japanese forces were destined to be pinched off on 23 November, D+3.
For some reason SLAM focuses on firing rates and not kills with grenade, knife and clubbed weapons. He also ignores that the Americans were told "... not to use rifles, however, except for the repulse of a direct attack”, which would have let the Japanese know how and where the Americans were deployed.
His analysis of Kwajalein shows where he insists that his low firing rate holds but ignores that US forces outnumbered Japanese forces 42,000 to 8,000 (maybe less).
What disturbs me about Grossman is that he didn't check this out and just sells it to his readers without a quibble, but does do a sort of CYA in the Notes on Section 1: Killing and the Existence of Resistance.
This is the must read article,
THE SECRET OF THE SOLDIERS WHO DIDN’T SHOOT from American Heritage magazine about SLAM.
Another from
Newsweek
